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The Development, Impact, and Long-
term Significance of Wartime Propa-
ganda on the Doughboys in World War
I: Personal Appeal vs Moral Imperative
Maggie Woods
“Army Strong” is now entering its sixth year as the
official recruiting slogan of the U.S. Army. It promises
that soldiers will possess strength in everything:
purpose, body, character, obedience, authority, and
success.  Explicit ideals like patriotism and humani-
tarianism and national goals like vanquishing a
particular enemy have been absent since the unpopu-
lar Vietnam War, suppressed in favor of an emphasis
on personal benefit.  A recruitment ad from 2011
emphasizes the Army’s role in individual soldiers’ lives,
showing poignant footage of soldiers with their fami-
lies, at the funerals of their peers, and in training
alongside fellow recruits.  With many Americans
feeling tricked into fighting an unnecessary war in
Iraq, the video avoids identifying a specific enemy or
political cause.  The song “American Soldier” plays in
the background, its lyrics stating proudly a more
nationalistic message: “when liberty’s in jeopardy, I
will always do what’s right” and “I don’t do it for the
money…I don’t do it for the glory, I just do it anyway.”1 
      1U.S. Army, “Army Strong: The Strength of the Nation,” The
Official Homepage of the United States Army, Army Media Player
video file, 9 Oct. 2011.
<http://www.army.mil/media/amp/?bctid=1211220712001>
(accessed 22 Feb. 2012).
82 Historical Perspectives June 2012
The 2011 version represents the blending of personal
and national appeals that the American government
used to encourage enlistment and draft registration in
1917.  A study of the evolution of World War I enlist-
ment propaganda places that blend in historical
context, demonstrating that propaganda provides an
accurate representation not of war but of popular
opinion toward war.  
Many works have examined the propaganda of
World War I. Robert A. Wells’s “Mobilizing Support for
War: An Analysis of American Propaganda during
World War I” (2002) reveals the pivotal role of anti-
German propaganda in shifting public opinion toward
war.  Jennifer D. Keene’s chapter “Morals and Morale”
in World War I: The American Soldier Experience (2011)
reveals American efforts to indoctrinate soldiers and
uplift their morale.  Neither, however, addresses in
depth the soldiers’ relationship with the propaganda,
what messages they found most appealing, how they
reconciled those messages with their experiences at
the front, and how propaganda evolved in response.
Propaganda’s Task
By 11 November 1918, the United States had
mobilized approximately four million men to serve in
the Army, a staggering accomplishment considering
that the nation began the war with not even one-
twentieth of that force.  Despite the record of battles
whose Allied death tolls measured in the hundreds of
thousands, young American men eagerly enlisted
within the first week of declaration.  Many did not
know even where the war was being fought and often
did not care.  As enlistee William Langer admitted, “I
can hardly remember a single instance of serious
discussion of American policy or of larger war issues. 
1
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We men, most of us young, were simply fascinated by
the prospect of adventure and heroism.”2  
Recruitment propaganda had to appeal to this
typical man, who did not necessarily understand the
war, was probably uneducated or even illiterate, and
was often motivated more by personal than national
interest.  The resultant propaganda played to personal
ambition, emphasizing material enticements over
moral ideals.  Once in the trenches and faced with the
reality of war and of their own unpreparedness,
soldiers realized the falsity of this materialistic propa-
ganda.  The official campaigns of the Committee on
Public Information (CPI) had presented the glories of
war, not the realities: body lice, equipment and food
shortages, and seemingly endless barrages around
their heads.  The resolve of the recruits, however, was
fortified rather than undermined by the emotional
propaganda that persisted alongside the materialistic
propaganda. Many remained heartened by their
underlying belief in the morality of their mission,
inspired by German atrocity stories, posters, and films
presenting Germans as beasts that had to be van-
quished for the sake of humanity.
The British Emotional Precedent
Even when the U.S. was still nominally neutral, the
British government primed American public opinion
through an effective anti-German propaganda cam-
paign that set the sensationalized tone for later propa-
ganda produced by the CPI.  The British government
      2William L. Langer, Gas and Flame in World War I (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), xviii-xix, in James H. Hallas, ed.,
Doughboy War: The American Expeditionary Force in World War I
(Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2000), 9.
84 Historical Perspectives June 2012
based its domestic campaign on Germany’s “Rape of
Belgium,” an event hyperbolized to dehumanize the
Germans.  The initial intellectual justification, that
Germany had violated international law by invading
neutral Belgium, was quickly replaced with a more
successful emotional version of the event, in which
German soldiers became medieval barbarians who
raped and pillaged defenseless Belgians.3  The Ger-
mans’ trespass of international law became a trans-
gression against human decency.  Cultivating this
savage image abroad, Britain released the “Report of
the Committee on Alleged German Outrages” (Bryce
Report) in the U.S, a detailed list of every crime Ger-
man soldiers committed in Belgium since 4 August
1914.  Scholar Nicoletta Gullace asserts that the
Committee and its report were especially crafted to
appeal to Americans: the head of the Committee,
James Bryce, had served as British ambassador to the
U.S., and the report was released barely a week after
German U-boats torpedoed the Lusitania, killing
American civilians.4
This British “Rape of Belgium” justification for war
reverberated throughout American films, posters, and
spoken word as the most cogent and memorable
reason for American involvement.  The Lusitania
became an irrefutable symbol of German aggression. 
An enlistee was told in 1917 that the “sinking of the
Lusitania was the last straw that led us into the war,”
      3Nicoletta F. Gullace, “The Blood of Our Sons”: Men, Women,
and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship during the Great War
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 22-23.
      4Ibid., 29.
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even though that event happened two years earlier.5 
Within a week of Congress’s declaration of war, Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on
Public Information to present the war effort from a
distinctly American perspective, but built on previous
British efforts.  Years of exposure to Britain’s publicity
made the rhetorical transition to war almost seamless
and might explain many men’s eagerness to enlist the
first day to fight in the Britons’ “chivalrous war.”6  
Recruitment and Draft Propaganda
Appealing variously to men’s sense of sympathy,
patriotism, honor, adventure, and ambition, recruit-
ment propaganda cultivated the perception that this
morally unambiguous war was not only a necessary
action against an irrationally brutal enemy but also an
opportunity for American men to prove and improve
themselves.  CPI’s chairman George Creel considered
visual and auditory propaganda, such as posters,
movies, and the speeches of Four Minute Men, partic-
ularly important in rousing support among the na-
tion’s considerable non-English-speaking and illiterate
populations.  Continuing the “Rape of Belgium”
tradition, incipient Hollywood produced anti-German
films featuring close-up depictions of the suffering of
French and Belgian women and children’s inflicted by
merciless German soldiers.7  
      5Connell Albertine, The Yankee Doughboy (Boston: Branden
Press, 1968), 9-10, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 7. 
      6Stewart Halsey Ross, Propaganda for War: How the United
States Was Conditioned to Fight the Great War of 1914-1918
(Jefferson: MacFarland, 1996), 3.
      7Robert A. Wells, “Mobilizing for War: An Analysis of
American Propaganda during World War I” (paper presented at
the annual meeting of the International Studies Association,
86 Historical Perspectives June 2012
Movie theaters provided venues for the remarkably
successful Four Minute Men, who addressed audi-
ences while the movie reels were changed.  These
speakers were initially charged with stirring up enough
enthusiasm for the war so that the draft’s introduction
would not result in riots, as had occurred during the
Civil War.8  Creel made sure his speakers appealed to
the broadest demographic possible.  Typically well-
known, respected members of the local community,
such as doctors and lawyers, Four Minute Men repre-
sented different ethnic backgrounds, addressing
audiences in Italian, Polish, Lithuanian, Magyar-
Hungarian, Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Bohemian-
Slovak, and Yiddish.9  The CPI standardized the Four
Minute Men’s messages by providing the speakers with
suggested material.10  The resultant speeches neatly
packaged Wilson’s and Creel’s public sentiments
explaining why America had to join the war.  
According to scholar Carol Oukrop, the Four
Minute Men’s speeches established that the U.S. was
savior not only of the Allies but also of liberty, democ-
racy, and humanity.  The speeches referenced the
Rape of Belgium, the invasion and sacrifice of France
(fondly associated with the Revolutionary War’s Gen-
eral Lafayette), the sacrifice of England (in the spirit of
New Orleans, LA, 24-27 Mar. 2002), ISA,
<http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/robertwells.html>
(accessed 14 Mar. 2012).
      8Lisa Mastrangelo, “World War I, Public Intellectuals, and
the Four Minute Men: Convergent Ideals of Public Speaking and
Civic Participation,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (2009):
612.
      9Ibid., 610.
      10Ibid., 618.
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Anglo-American solidarity), and the faltering participa-
tion of Russia.11  This last was particularly important
once Russia liberated itself from autocracy.  As Presi-
dent Wilson said in his speech to Congress on 2 April
1917, “The world must be made safe for democracy.” 
Some speakers were so persuasive and passionate that
male audience members enlisted or registered as soon
as the speech ended.  Corporal Martin J. Hogan
determined to sign up even while the speaker was still
talking and was the first to jump up when the speaker
“wound up by asking all the men willing to serve the
country, to see her through her present emergency
with rifles in hand, to step upon the stage.”12
Although Creel’s Four Minute Men program reach-
ed most of the home front population, including non-
English-speaking minority groups, it is difficult to
evaluate the Four Minute Men’s success in encourag-
ing men to enlist or to register for the draft and in
inculcating in them specific justifications for the war. 
Scholar Lisa Mastrangelo notes that the CPI declared
the program a success when, on 5 June 1917, ten
million men registered for the draft with “no publicized
riots and few protests.”13 Mastrangelo, however, doubts
      11Carol Oukrop, “The Four Minute Men Became National
Network during World War I,” Journalism Quarterly 52, no. 4
(Winter 1975): 635.
      12Martin J. Hogan, The Shamrock Battalion of the Rainbow
(New York: D. Appleton, 1919), in Hallas, Doughboy War, 8.
      13According to Alfred E. Cornebise [War as Advertised: The
Four Minute Men and America’s Crusade 1917-1918, Memoirs
156 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984), 3-6],
the Four Minute Men started as a local group in Chicago on 28
April 1917 and were not endorsed formally by the CPI until 16
June 1917, but Creel took credit for starting the program [in
George Creel, “Public Opinion in War Time,” American Academy
88 Historical Perspectives June 2012
the CPI’s claim that the Four Minute Men were the
most effective recruiting tool.  She attributes the
results to a pre-existing general desire to take part in
the war, a conclusion that does not take into account
the presence of three million draft dodgers, nearly
eleven percent of draft-eligible American men.14  But
the CPI’s claim is undeniably weakened by the fact
that only a few veterans were like Corporal Hogan, who
remembered enlisting after listening to a Four Minute
Man.  Veterans instead widely echoed messages from
recruitment posters.
Posters visually displayed a variety of reasons to
enlist or register for the draft.  Many fostered the
hatred that the British had planted: the famous
“Destroy This Mad Brute” poster (see Appendix 1)
depicted the German soldier as a drooling ape en-
croaching on America’s shore from a ruined Europe,
clutching a distressed, partially naked Lady Liberty.15 
Propagandists expected that moral outrage at the
actions of the “Huns” (a term coined with the initial
“Rape of Belgium” propaganda that emphasized Ger-
mans’ barbarity) would inflame men to enlist.  The
poster “Tell That to the Marines!” (see Appendix 2)
shows a man who angrily strips himself of his civilian
clothes after reading the newspaper headline “Huns
of Political and Social Science 78 (July 1918): 186-87]; 
Mastrangelo, “World War I,” 612.
      14Statistic from Jennifer D. Keene, World War I: The
American Soldier Experience (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2011), 37.
      15H.R. Hopps, “Destroy This Mad Brute,” 1916, in Ross,
Propaganda for War, ii.
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Kill Women and Children.”16  Few soldiers, however,
attributed their eagerness to enlist to moral outrage.
Propagandists rapidly revised their posters to
encourage enlistment and registration in ways that
might appeal to the majority of their audience, begin-
ning a trend that sacrificed ideological appeals.  The
emphasis shifted from explaining why America was
fighting the war to explaining why an individual
should enlist.  Since moral outrage at Germany’s
belligerence and cruelty was not enough to provoke
sufficient enlistments, new posters presented more
material justifications.  The potential of upward
mobility was a popular theme: “Earn While You Learn”
posters (see Appendix 3) promised education and
vocational training to recruits, benefits which might
have been particularly appealing to this generation of
soldiers, a third of whom were illiterate.17  The consid-
erable presence of these posters suggests their relative
success, but recruits had mixed opinions regarding the
realization of this promise, particularly its education
component.  Non-English-speaking recruits were often
eager to receive free ESL education.18  Other recruits,
however, expressed annoyance that they were required
to take remedial English classes as a part of their
      16James Montgomery Flagg, “Tell That to the Marines!,”
1918, Library of Congress, JPEG,
<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2008679015/> (accessed
22 Feb. 2012).
      17William Oberhardt, “General Pershing Says,” [1917 or
1918], Library of Congress, JPEG,
<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/00651737/> (22 Feb.
2012); Hallas, Doughboy War, 20.
      18James M. Howard, The Autobiography of a Regiment (New
York: n.p., 1920), 25-26, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 22.
90 Historical Perspectives June 2012
training: they were “‘going over there to shoot Ger-
mans, not to write letters to ‘em!’”19
Many men attributed their enlistment to various
forms of social pressure or to the sheer excitement of
adventure overseas, and posters quickly adapted to
reflect these attitudes.  Poster creators emphasized
feelings of camaraderie and subtly applied peer pres-
sure, noticing that men often enlisted in groups. 
Saddler John Joseph Brennan made a point in his
wartime diary that he and his friend Harry Willard
joined the Army together.20  Sergeant Dan Edwards,
already in the reserve, reenlisted the day of declara-
tion, as did all of the men at his ranch.  Even though
“[h]alf of them barely knew where the war was and
didn’t give a damn,” they were “sure one happy crowd,”
having enlisted together.21  Posters responded to this
social phenomenon by featuring calls to arms like
“Enlist Now and Go with Your Friends” or “Fight
alongside Your Friends” (see Appendix 4 and 5).22 
      19Evan A. Edwards, From Doniphan to Verdun: The Story of
the 140th Infantry (Lawrence, KS: World Company, 1920), 19, in
Hallas, Doughboy War, 22.
      20John Joseph Brennan, My Own True Story of My
Experience in the Army ([Albany, NY?]: self-published, 1982), 9,
World War I: The Great War, in Veterans History Project:
Experiencing War, Library of Congress, 26 Oct. 2011
<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/vhp-
stories/loc.natlib.afc2001001.00282/pageturner?ID=pm000100
1> (accessed 22 Feb. 2012).
      21Lowell Thomas, This Side of Hell (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, Doran, 1932), 73, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 7.
      22Arthur N. Edrop, “Make the World Safe,” 1917, Willard and
Dorothy Straight Collection, Library of Congress, JPEG,
<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2001700145/> (accessed
22 Feb. 2012); Unknown artist, “Give the Guard a Fighting
Chance,” [between 1917 and 1919], Library of Congress, JPEG, <
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      16James Montgomery Flagg, “Tell That to the Marines!,”
1918, Library of Congress, JPEG,
<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2008679015/> (accessed
22 Feb. 2012).
      17William Oberhardt, “General Pershing Says,” [1917 or
1918], Library of Congress, JPEG,
<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/00651737/> (22 Feb.
2012); Hallas, Doughboy War, 20.
      18James M. Howard, The Autobiography of a Regiment (New
York: n.p., 1920), 25-26, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 22.
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Featuring pictures of recruits with captions like “He
Did His Duty—Will You?” (see Appendix 6), posters
evoked peer pressure like that experienced by Navy
firefighter Russell Powers, whose “buddies…wanted to
know why the hell [he had] waited so long, from the
6th. to the 8th. [of April] to get in.”23 
Regardless of material or social incentive, the
prospect of transcending their mundane lives by
crossing the Atlantic to take part in a glorious war was
enticement enough for many young Americans. 
“[H]ope and enthusiasm” characterized the attitude of
these enlistees: hope and enthusiasm for an adventure
in which they were the heroes “following the flag over
a shell torn field, with fixed bayonet.”24  Recruitment
propaganda did not disabuse soldiers of this idealized,
swashbuckling image of war but encouraged men to
enlist on the promise of adventure.  Such posters
emphasized the once-in-a-lifetime quality of this
opportunity to travel outside of the U.S., expenses
paid.  One poster (see Appendix 7) proclaimed, “Here
Is Your Chance To See FRANCE AND THE RHINE”
[original capitalization] in large letters overpowering
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/00651605/> (accessed 22
Feb. 2012).
      23Unknown artist, “He Did His Duty,” [between 1914 and
1918], Library of Congress, JPEG,
<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/00651865/> (accessed 22
Feb. 2012); Russell Powers, interview by Tammy Lien, PDF
transcription of audio cassette recording, unknown location, 9
Nov. 1984, 1.
      24Robert W. Kean, Dear Marraine (n.p.: n.p. 1969), xi-xii, in
Hallas, Doughboy War, 6; Justin M. Klingenberger, in One
Hundred Thirteenth Engineers in France (Nancy, FR: Berger-
Levrault, 1919), 78, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 9.
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even the call in the bottom lines to enlist.25  William
Langer remembered that he and his friends felt keenly
the urgency of this type of message.  Fighting in this
Great War was their “one great chance for excitement
and risk.”  They “could not afford to pass it up” only to
continue lives that “would run in familiar, routine
channels.”26  The war did offer a break from routine,
but not in ways that Langer and most other enlistees
anticipated.
Camp and Battlefield Realities
The war in Europe resembled no other in its
stagnation and bloodshed, and certainly it did not
present the kind of adventure American men had been
promised.  When recruits, both enlisted and drafted,
arrived at American and European training camps,
and later the European trenches, they discovered that
propaganda had sugar-coated or omitted entirely the
shortcomings of American military preparation.  The
American government was undeniably unprepared for
war, despite the claims of the CPI.  The Four Minute
Men tried to counter negative publicity by tailoring
facts to fit their message.  They spoke glowingly of the
number of men signed in the different military branch-
es, the activities of non-military government organiza-
tions, and the mobilization efforts of railways and
industries.27  They omitted (blatantly, in hindsight)
information about troops’ equipment and prepared-
ness. 
      25Unknown artist, “Here Is Your Chance,” [1917 or 1918],
Library of Congress, JPEG,
<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/00651738/ > (accessed 22
Feb. 2012). 
      26 Langer, Gas, xviii-xix, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 9.
      27Oukrop, “The Four Minute Men,” 635. 
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Speakers neglected the fact that training camps in
the U.S. were still being built.  The first divisions were
sent overseas to train under Allied leaders before being
re-inducted into General Pershing’s American Expedi-
tionary Forces.  Supplies, such as weapons and
uniforms, were insufficient because industry was still
mobilizing.  Two months prior to the declaration of
war, in response to the government’s requests for
heavy artillery, machine guns, clothing, and other
necessities, suppliers predicted that production of
adequate numbers would take over a year.28 Recruits
trained with sticks instead of guns and in civilian
clothes instead of uniforms.  When camps did manage
to provide uniforms, they were often the wrong size. 
John Brennan complained that the seat of his pants
“were big enough for a couple of bread baskets to hide
away in.”29
Even the shock of camp life, with its rigid discipline
and shortage of supplies, did not prepare troops for the
conditions at the front.  The comparative attitudes
toward the camps and the trenches are summed up by
Brennan as his division marched closer to enemy fire:
“We used to think that we were treated pretty rough
and had hard times.  But as the days roll by and we
are getting nearer to the actual fighting, we seem to
look back and say those were the happy days.”30  Daily
rations in the camps had been almost five thousand
calories and heavy in protein to sustain recruits
during intense training, but “a feeling of gnawing
hunger prevailed almost from the period at which
      28Hallas, Doughboy War, 24. 
      29Brennan, My Own True Story, 10. 
      30Ibid., 56.
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campaigning began to the point where it ended.”31 
Troops on the march and in the trenches relied almost
exclusively on canned foods for their one daily meal.  
Some soldiers, with no other way in which to cope
with the shock but humor, joked that they envied their
“cooties” (body lice) because they at least “always ha[d]
something warm to eat.”32  Vermin such as lice and
rats presented unique problems.  Soldiers had to
improvise in their encounters with cooties and rats, as
they had received no official warnings about their
existence, let alone their persistence.  Their unin-
formed solutions were often just as harmful as the
pests themselves: some would steal kerosene to pour
over themselves, discovering much to their discomfort
that it burned them but left the lice unharmed.33
In addition to the living conditions, European
trench warfare was utterly alien to Americans and did
not conform to the image of open warfare depicted by
posters and films.  The first episode of the popular
newsreel series America Goes Over (1918) cleverly
emphasizes Allied soldiers’ progress and motion: it
glosses over the stagnation on the Western Front and
shows instead activities like building bridges in Italy
and marching across open fields, projecting purposeful
      31Keene, World War I, 45; Leonard P. Kurtz, Beyond No Man’s
Land (Buffalo, NY: Foster & Stewart, 1937), 30, in Hallas,
Doughboy War, 183. 
      32Charles Minder, This Man’s War (New York: Pevensey,
1931), 342, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 184-85.
      33Horatio Rogers, The Diary of an Artillery Scout (North
Andover, MA: n.p., 1975), 217, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 185.
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industriousness.34  Also absent is footage of attacks on
the Allied trenches.  During such attacks veterans
remembered being so “enveloped in tremendous fear”
that they lost the “ability to exert muscular control.”35 
Veterans recalled images of themselves balled up and
clutching their knees as they hid in shell holes or
against the back walls of their trenches.  This was not
the glorious, open-field fighting that “American sol-
diers love[d]”; it was not fighting at all, at least in their
minds.36  Even in battle, soldiers lost the worth that
propaganda had awarded them.  They were reminded
not of their heroism but of their expendability: they
were ordered to take care of the horses before them-
selves because “a man could take care of himself while
a horse couldn’t, and…if a man was lost, another
could take his place, but horses were scarce!”37
The Doughboys’ Creative Response
Faced with these dire circumstances, many soldiers
found comfort in their own popular culture that
flouted official propaganda and represented not the
home front culture they left but their own current
experiences at the front.  Officers who censored letters
were frequently disappointed in the lack of ideals
discussed by the soldiers; instead they read letters
      34U.S. Army Signal Corps, America Goes Over (Part I) (1918),
Prelinger Archives, Internet Archive: Digital Library of Free Books,
Movies, Music & Wayback Machine, online video file,
<http://www.archive.org/details/AmericaG1918> (accessed 22
Feb. 2012).
      35William F. Clarke, Over There with O’Ryan’s Roughnecks
(Seattle: Superior, 1966), 55-56, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 175. 
      36Brennan, My Own True Story, 83. 
      37George Mozley, Our Miracle Battery (n.p.: n.p., 1920), 48, in
Hallas, Doughboy War, 182.  
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“about [the soldiers’] health, minor discomforts of
military service and family gossip.”38  Likewise, songs
popular among the troops were rarely patriotic but
rather raunchy, nonsensical, humorous, or dreamlike. 
Army Field Clerk Will Judy recorded that the national
anthem was “sung very seldom and never of our own
accord.”39  A private, remembering a photograph in the
Literary Gazette of a chaplain blessing his troops, who
sang a Protestant hymn as they marched, laughed
because the songs sung by his own division “were as
bawdy as the collective imaginations of 3,000 horny
men could conceive.”40  
Some soldiers did find strength in the humanitar-
ian appeals of early propaganda, envisioning them-
selves as saviors of the overrun Allies and the free
world.  Seeing the bedraggled dregs of British draftees
in his shared trench, Lieutenant Joseph Douglas
Lawrence realized that the fresh, ready-for-the-fight
Americans were indeed needed: Allied forces were
physically depleted and psychologically defeated in
their attitude toward the war.41  Americans were a new
hope.  They were healthy and well-fed, and they sang
so raucously as they marched toward stagnant battle
fields that they had to be quieted so as not to attract
enemy attention.  They were seen as the heroes, albeit
naïve ones who did not understand the rather unhe-
      38Keene, World War I, 60.  
      39Will Judy, A Soldier’s Diary (Chicago: Judy Publishing,
1930), 125, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 199. 
      40Albert M. Ettinger, A Doughboy with the Fighting 69th
(Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 1992), 150, in Hallas,
Doughboy War, 197. 
      41Joseph Douglas Lawrence, Fighting Soldier: The AEF in
1918 (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1985), xiii.
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roic ways of this war.  One veteran reiterated the
propagandistic notion that he became convinced that
the Allies’ “fight [was] our fight, because it espouse[d]
the principles of the United States of America, democ-
racy, justice, and liberty.”42  
Others fought because they were convinced that
Germans were indeed monsters.  Some harbored
personal vendettas against Germany after being
wounded, and others could not abandon their fellow
doughboys.  However, a considerable portion pos-
sessed a zeal for annihilating the Germans that sur-
passed even these reasons, as the German atrocity
stories featured in early propaganda spread across the
frontline.  Lieutenant Robert Hoffman, although he
conceded that “little homelike touches to the places
[the Germans] had left showed them to be men like
ourselves who could enjoy the simple pleasures of life,”
still believed that the Germans “weren’t quite
human.”43  He even quoted the Bryce Report to provide
an example of the rumors that the soldiers “were
always hearing.”44  Sergeant Arthur Havlin echoed the
sentiment that the Germans were inhuman, remem-
bering that “the number of prisoners captured by [his]
division was materially less than what it should have
been” because the soldiers had heard the atrocity
stories and had decided that they could not suffer a
      42Arthur Guy Empey, “Over the Top” by an American Soldier
Who Went (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1917), v. 
      43Robert Hoffman, I Remember the Last War (York, PA:
Strength & Health, 1940), 124, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 187.  
      44Ibid., 185-86, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 186. 
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German to live.45  This same mindset encouraged
Havlin’s division to die fighting rather than to risk
capture at the hands of the Germans. 
Although wartime propaganda did not influence all
soldiers to the degree it did Havlin and his men, it did
shape most recruits’ expectations of war so that many
felt shock upon entering even the training camps and
were unprepared both physically and mentally for
trench warfare.  Many veterans, however, remembered
their determination to fight more than any resentment
of their government.  In his wartime diary, John
Brennan admitted, “I don’t know what would happen
to us if we got discouraged,” thinking only that “it
would be a sad ending.”46  Yet despite his sickeningly
uncomfortable sea journey to Europe, his confronta-
tions with flesh-nibbling rats and body lice, and his
experiences of frantically hiding from shots and shells,
he affirmed that he and his fellows were “not down-
hearted” but eager to fight.47  
Conclusion
Recruitment propaganda never features the unat-
tractive realities of war.  Instead propaganda reveals a
government’s effort to understand and use the prevail-
ing emotions, needs, and desires of its citizens.  In
World War I, propaganda adapted, not to reflect the
changing realities of war, but to account for public
reactions to war itself and to offer a variety of induce-
ments to enlist, tailored to differing motives.  Some of
the lessons provided by the development of World War
      45Arthur C. Havlin, The History of Company A 102nd Machine
Gun Battalion Twenty-Sixth Division, A.E.F.  (privately printed,
1928), 66, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 186.
      46Brennan, My Own True Story, 54.
      47Ibid., 78.
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      44Ibid., 185-86, in Hallas, Doughboy War, 186. 
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I propaganda are evident in subsequent military
recruitment campaigns.  When political goals are not
sufficiently clear or compelling, more emphasis is
placed on the benefits to the individual enlistee.  
In the context of the shifting focus of World War I
propaganda, recruitment campaigns during subse-
quent wars can be seen as a measure of popular
support (or lack thereof) for political goals.  The almost
total lack of political content in today’s recruitment
efforts indicates the political unpopularity of current
American military actions.  Studies of popular opinion
during wartime often examine the impact of propa-
ganda targeting civilians rather than potential fighters,
such as the famous Four-Minute-Men and poster
campaigns that promoted the purchase of Liberty
Bonds.  However, the development of recruitment
propaganda provides just as, if not more, valuable a
gauge of public opinion toward war because such
propaganda has to convince people to sacrifice not just
their money but their lives.
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